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CRIMINAL LAW-FALSE

PERSONATION STATUTE-ALLEGATION OF

FRAUDULENT INTENT IS UNNECESSARY TO CHARGE DEFENDANT
WITH FALSELY PERSONATING EMPLOYEE OF THE
UNITED STATES

United States v. Wilkes (1984)
In 1884, Congress passed the Federal False Personation Act,' which
was intended to protect innocent persons from loss by their reliance on
false assumptions of governmental authority, and to protect the prestige
and importance of federal office. 2 In its original form, the false personation statute expressly prohibited one "with intent to defraud" from
falsely pretending to be a government employee or officer, "and
[1] act[ing] as such, or [2] in such pretended character demand[ing] or'3
obtain[ing] ... any money, paper, document, or other valuable thing."
4
As a result of a 1943 Supreme Court decision and a subsequent
1. Act of Apr. 18, 1884, ch. 26, 23 Stat. 11 (1884) (current version at 18
U.S.C. § 912 (1982)).
2. See United States v. Barnow, 239 U.S. 74, 80 (1915) (dual purpose is to
protect persons from loss through reliance upon false assumptions of federal
authority and to maintain the dignity and reputation of federal office). See also
United States v. Guthrie, 387 F.2d 569, 571 (4th Cir. 1967) (purpose of false
personation statute is to protect the dignity and prestige of federal office), cert.
denied, 392 U.S. 927 (1968); Honea v. United States, 344 F.2d 798, 802 (5th Cir.
1965) ("the statute seeks to protect... the dignity, prestige and importance of
federal office")(citing United States v. Barnow, 239 U.S. 74, 78 (1915)). For a
discussion of Guthrie, see infra notes 26-29 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Honea, see infra note 24.
3. Act of April 18, 1884, ch. 26, 23 stat. 11, 11-12 (1884) (current version at
18 U.S.C. § 912 (1982)). For a further discussion of the development of the
statutory language of § 912, see infra note 5 and accompanying text.
To avoid confusion regarding the two offenses described in § 912, they will
hereinafter be referred to as clause [1] and clause [2] of § 912.
4. See United States v. Lepowitch, 318 U.S. 702 (1943). In Lepowitch, the
defendants were indicted under the false personation statute for masquerading
as Federal Bureau of Investigation agents in order to obtain information about
another individual. Id. at 703. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the indictment, holding that the conduct of the defendants was "reprehensible" but
that it did not come within the terms of the statute since asking for information
was not "taking upon themselves to act as [FBI] agents nor was the information
demanded.., a valuable thing." Id. at 703 (quoting United States v. Lepowitch,
48 F. Supp. 846, 847 (1942)). The Supreme Court reversed and held that fraudulent intent for the purposes of clause [1] requires only that the "defendants
have, by artifice and deceit, sought to cause the deceived person to follow some
course he would not have pursued but for the deceitful conduct." Id. at 704. In
expressly limiting its definition of fraudulent intent to clause [1], the Supreme
Court stated:
[T]he first clause of this statute, the only one under consideration here,
defines one offense; the second clause defines another. While more
than mere deceitful attempt[s] to affect the course of action of another

(997)
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revision of the statutory language, 5 contemporary courts are divided as
to whether an express allegation of an "intent to defraud" is required in
an indictment pursuant to section 912.6 In United States v. Wilkes, 7 the
Third Circuit adopted the view held by the majority of the United States
is required under the second clause of the statute, which speaks of an
intent to obtain a valuable thing, the very absence of these words of
limitation in the first portion of the act persuades us that, under it, a
person may be defrauded although he parts with something of no measurable value at all.
Id. at 704-05.
5. See 18 U.S.C. § 912 (1982). In 1948, Congress revised the false personation statute by increasing its penalty from $500 to $1000 and from two years to
three years in prison, and by deleting the words "with intent to defraud the
United States or any person." 18 U.S.C. § 912 (revision note) (1982). The only
explanation in the revision note for the deletion of the words "intent to defraud" was that the words were "omitted as meaningless in view of U.S. v.
Lapowitch [sic]." Id. The statute was first enacted in 1884, Act of Apr. 18, 1884,
ch. 26, 23 Stat. 11 (1884), and has been revised three times. In March, 1909, a
uniform penal code was adopted and the statute was clarified and condensed.
See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, §§ 32, 66, 35 Stat. 1095, 1100 (1909). Prior to
the latest revision in 1948, the statute was revised in 1938. See Act of Feb. 28,
1938, ch. 37, 52 Stat. 82 (1938).
As revised, the false personation statute now provides:
Whoever falsely assumes or pretends to be an officer or employee acting under the authority of the United States or any department, agency
or officer thereof, and [1] acts as such, or [2] in such pretended character demands or obtains any money, paper, document or thing of value,
shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than three
years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 912 (1982) (brackets added). For a further discussion of the original
form of the false impersonation statute, see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
6. A majority of the United States courts of appeals have held that an express allegation of fraudulent intent is not necessary in an indictment under
either clause of § 912. See, e.g., United States v. Cord, 654 F.2d 490 (7th Cir.
1981) (clause [2] violation); United States v. Robbins, 613 F.2d 688 (8th Cir.
1979) (clause [2] violation); United States v. Rosser, 528 F.2d 652 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (clause [1] violation); United States v. Rose, 500 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1975)
(clause [2] violation), vacated on other grounds, 422 U.S. 1031 (1975); United States
v. Mitman, 459 F.2d 451 (9th Cir.) (clause [2] violation), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 863
(1972); United States v. Guthrie, 387 F.2d 569 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392
U.S. 927 (1968) (clause [1] violation). For a discussion of Cord, see infra note 39.
For a discussion of Rosser, see infra notes 31-36 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of Rose, see infra note 40. For a discussion of Guthrie, see infra notes
26-29 and accompanying text.
The Fifth Circuit, however, has concluded that fraudulent intent is an essential element for an offense under either clause of section 912 and therefore must
be alleged in an indictment. See, e.g., United States v. Cohen, 631 F.2d 1223 (5th
Cir. 1980) (clause [1] violation); United States v. Randolph, 460 F.2d 367 (5th
Cir. 1972) (clause [1] violation); Honea v. United States, 344 F.2d 798 (5th Cir.
1965) (clause [2] violation). For a discussion of Randolph, see infra note 24. For
a discussion of Honea, see infra note 24.
7. 732 F.2d 1154 (3d Cir. 1984). The case was argued before judges Aldisert, Higginbotham and Sloviter. Judge Higginbotham wrote for a unanimous
court. Id. at 1154.
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courts of appeals 8 that a specific allegation of fraudulent intent is not
required in an indictment charging a violation of section 912. 9
In Wilkes, the defendant, Warren A. Wilkes, impersonated a Social
Security Administration employee in order to collect money from a
sixty-two year old disabled veteran, Raymond Bender. 10 On several occasions, Wilkes telephoned Bender and informed him that he had received overpayments of his disability benefits that Bender would have to
repay in order to remain eligible for future benefits.' I Later, Wilkes arrived at Bender's residence and collected the alleged overpayments. 12
Eventually, Bender's brother became suspicious of Wilkes and contacted
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which investigated the defendant
and subsequently arrested him.' 3 Wilkes was charged with violating
both clauses of section 912.14 The charging indictment mirrored the
language of the statute, but it did not specifically allege that Wilkes had
an intent to defraud.' 5 A district court convicted Wilkes and sentenced
16
Wilkes appealed. 17
him to eighteen months imprisonment.
On appeal, Wilkes asserted that a specific intent to defraud was a
8. For a discussion of the majority view, see infra notes 24-36 and accompanying text.

9. 732 F.2d at 1155. The court held that fraudulent intent is "present for a
section 912 [ 1] offense whenever the element 'acting as such' is proven and [that
such intent] need not be specifically alleged." Id. at 1159. Similarly, the Third
Circuit held that an intent to defraud is present for purposes of a § 912, clause
[2] offense "whenever one demands or receives money or a thing of value in
'pretended character,' acting under the authority of the United States." Id. at

1159. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's holding in Wilkes, see infra
notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
10. 732 F.2d at 1155.

11. Id. The defendant first telephoned Bender on September 7, 1982, and
identified himself as Jake Williams, an employee of the Social Security Administration, calling on behalf of Warren A. Wilkes. Id. The defendant informed
Bender that Bender had received $160 in overpayments. Id. The indictment

charged that the defendant repeated this scheme on 10 separate occasions between September and December of 1982. Id. at 1160 n.5.
12. Id. at 1155.

13. Id. The FBI recorded a phone conversation between Wilkes and
Bender during which Wilkes told Bender that he had to repay $50. Id. The FBI
arrested Wilkes when he came to collect the money on the following day. Id.
14. Id. For the text of the false personation statute, see supra note 5.
15. 732 F.2d at 1155. The indictment alleged that the defendant pretended
to be an employee of the United States and acted under its authority, that the
defendant acted as such, and that in such pretended character demanded and
obtained money from Raymond Bender. Id. For the text of the indictment, see
infra note 45.
16. 732 F.2d at 1155. Although the defendant had earlier moved to dismiss
the indictment for failure to charge "intent to defraud" in any of the eleven
counts, the trial court denied the motion. Id. The trial court reasoned that the
indictment was sufficient since it charged in the exact terminology of the statute.
The trial court concluded that the prosecution need not specifically allege an
intent to defraud in the indictment. Id.
17. Id. at 1156.
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necessary element for a section 912 offense that must be expressly alleged in an indictment.18 The Third Circuit began its analysis of the
question by reviewing the legislative history of the false personation
statute. 19 Noting that the revision note to the 1948 change to section
912 stated that the words "intent to defraud" were stricken in light of
the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Lepowitch, 20 the Third

Circuit examined that decision in order to determine why Congress
viewed Lepowitch as rendering the phrase "intent to defraud" meaningless. 2 1 The Wilkes court concluded that because the Supreme Court had
decided "intent to defraud" for purposes of the false personation statute merely required a deceitful attempt to "cause the deceived person to
follow some course he would not have pursued but for the deceitful conduct," the phrase was rendered meaningless in the minds of the revisers
of section 912.22

After reviewing the statute's legislative history and Lepowitch, the
Third Circuit addressed the central issue presented in Wilkes: whether
an express allegation of fraudulent intent was required to charge a person with a violation of section 912.23 The Third Circuit acknowledged
that the Fifth Circuit was the only circuit court of appeals that still required intent to defraud to be specifically pleaded in an indictment
charging a violation of clause [1] or clause [2] of section 912.24 The
18. Id. Wilkes based his argument on the fact that the false personation
statute in its original form expressly required proof of an "intent to defraud."
Id. For the relevant text of the original statute, see supra text accompanying note
3.

19. 732 F.2d at 1156. For a discussion of the legislative history of § 912,
see supra note 5.

20. 318 U.S. 702 (1943). For a discussion of Lepowitch, see supra note 4.
21.
22.
23.
24.

732 F.2d at 1156-57.
Id. at 1157 (quoting Lepowitch, 318 U.S. at 704).
Id. at 1157.
Id. (citing United States v. Cohen, 631 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1980) clause

[1] violation); United States v. Randolph, 460 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1972) (clause
[1] violation); Honea v. United States, 344 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1965) (clause [2]
violation)).
In Honea, the defendant was convicted of violating clause [2] after defrauding a young widow of $14,000 by impersonating a retired colonel and an
agent of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding
that the prosecution's failure to allege fraudulent intent fatally flawed the indictment. Id. at 804. The court reasoned that fraudulent intent remained an essential element of § 912 since Congress only intended to streamline the wording of
the statute when it revised the statute in 1948, not to effectuate substantive
changes in the federal criminal law. Id. at 801. The court based its reasoning, in
part, on the comments ofJudge Holtzoff of the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia, who assisted in the revision of the federal criminal
code. See Holtzoff, Preface to Title 18, USCA, 18 U.S.C.A. at xv (1969). Judge
Holtzoff stated that "[i]n general, with few exceptions, the Code does not attempt to change existing law. Every provision has been brought down to date.
The law has been rearranged and greatly simplified and modernized in phraseology." Id. The Fifth Circuit also examined the legislative history of § 912, noting
that fraudulent intent under the statute as originally enacted was an explicit ele-
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Third Circuit then proceeded to examine the opposing majority position
25
and the divergent rationales supporting that position.
The court addressed the Fourth Circuit's rationale in United States v.
Guthrie,2 6 which interpreted the congressional revision of section 912 as
entirely excluding fraudulent intent as an essential element of a clause
[1] offense. 2 7 The Third Circuit noted that in Guthrie the Fourth Circuit
did not consider the legislative change as an inadvertent result of congressional misinterpretation of Lepowitch. 2 8 Rather, the Guthrie court relied on the "accepted canon of statutory construction that where
Congress has advertently changed the legislative language the change
ment of both clauses of § 912 because the phrase "intent to defraud" pertained
to both clause [1] and clause [2]. 344 F.2d at 801. The Honea court asserted that
the revisers did not intend to delete an essential element of the crime of falsely
personating a government official or employee, but rather viewed the definition
of fraudulent intent in Lepowitch (a "deceitful attempt to affect the course of action of another") as making the inclusion of the phrase "intent to defraud" in
§ 912 unnecessary. Id. at 802-03. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the revisers

intended to "make the statutory wording conform to authoritative judicial construction, and to carry forward, by ... streamlined wording .... the Lepowitch
statement of what facts would make out a violation of the offense involved in that
case." Id. at 802.
Thus deciding that fraudulent intent was essential to either § 912 offense,
the Honea court held that fraudulent intent as defined in Lepowitch only applied
to § 912, clause [1], violations, whereas fraudulent intent for § 912, clause [2],
violations required more: an intent to wrongfully deprive another of property.
Id. at 803. Therefore, failure to adequately allege fraudulent intent as an element of the charged clause [2] offense in Honea rendered the indictment defective. Accordingly, the court set Honea's conviction aside. Id. at 804.
In Randolph, the defendant was convicted of violating clause [1] of § 912.
460 F.2d at 368. The defendant in Randolph impersonated a United States Army
officer and wrote a letter to his (the defendant's) son advising that he had been
killed in action. Id. at 368-69. The Fifth Circuit reversed the defendant's conviction, holding that fraudulent intent as defined by the Supreme Court in Lepowitch
remained an essential element of clause [1] of § 912. Id. at 368. The Randolph

court reasoned that the Lepowitch Court did not "hold that an allegation of intent
to defraud was unnecessary, but instead defined the nature of the 'fraud' required." Id. at 370 (emphasis added). The Fifth Circuit concluded that the revisers of § 912 did not intend to broaden the scope of § 912 "so as to make...

foolish bravado without any intent to deceive a federal felony." Id.
25. 732 F.2d at 1157.
26. 387 F.2d 569 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 927 (1969). In Guthr/e,
the defendants appealed from ajudgment convicting them of violating clause
[1] of § 912 by attempting to defraud a bank customer out of his savings account
by posing as federal bank examiners. Id. at 570. The Fourth Circuit rejected the
defendants' argument that the indictment failed since it did not allege fraudulent intent, and held that fraudulent intent no longer remained an essential element of an offense under clause [1] of section 912. Id. at 571. For a discussion
of the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of § 912 and its requirements, see NOTE,
FALSE PERSONATION: ACTS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT UNDER 18 U.S.C. SECTION
912, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 654 (1984).
27. 732 F.2d at 1157 (discussing Guthrie, 387 F.2d at 571).
28. Id. at 1157.
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must be given effect." ' 29 The Third Circuit, in Wilkes, noted that the
common thread in the decisions following Guthrie was "that the analysis
of Lepowitch and the subsequent legislative revision in 1948 were directly
30
contrary to the Fifth Circuit's approach."
After reviewing the Fourth Circuit's approach in Guthrie, the Wilkes
court addressed the District of Columbia Circuit's decision in United
States v. Rosser,3 1 which attempted to reconcile the divergent rationales
of the Fourth and Fifth Circuits. The Third Circuit noted that the Rosser
court agreed with the Fifth Circuit's finding that Congress did not intend to broaden the scope of section 912 when it adopted the 1948 revision of the statute.3 2 The Rosser court also agreed with the Fourth
Circuit's conclusion that courts should be "hesitant to read back into the
33
statutory definition of a crime words specifically excised by Congress."
The Third Circuit also pointed out that the Rosser court concluded that
when a person pretended to be an officer or employee of the United
States and "acted as such" under clause [1], 3 4 then the Lepowitch definition of intent to defraud was satisfied. 3 5 The Third Circuit in Wilkes fol29. Id. (quoting Guthrie, 387 F.2d at 571). Under its approach in Guthrie, the
Fourth Circuit expressly rejected the Fifth Circuit's position in Honea that Congress did not intend to change the substantive meaning of the statute. 387 F.2d
at 571. The Fourth Circuit stated that while " '[i]n general, with few exceptions,
the Code does not attempt to change existing law,' the Revisers' note compels
the conclusion that this alteration of § 912 constitutes one of the few exceptions.' " Id. (citing Holtzoff, supra note 24, at xvi) (emphasis added). The Fourth
Circuit further justified the elimination of fraudulent intent as an essential element to be charged under clause [1] of § 912 by reasoning that "injury to the
federal government is occasioned by masquerading and acting as a government
official regardless of fraudulent intent." 387 F.2d at 571. For a discussion of
Honea, see supra note 24.

30. 732 F.2d at 1157. See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 699 F.2d 177 (4th
Cir.) (reaffirming deletion of fraudulent intent as element of § 912 offense), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 122 (1983); United States v. Cord, 654 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1981)
(no allegation of fraudulent intent required for clause [2] violation); United
States v. Robbins, 613 F.2d 688 (8th Cir. 1979) (questioning wisdom of requiring fraudulent intent in light of legislative change); United States v. Rose, 500
F.2d 12 (2d Cir.) (requirement of clause [2] that a thing of value be demanded or
received adequately insures presence of fraudulent intent), vacated on other
grounds, 422 U.S. 1031 (1975); United States v. Mitman, 459 F.2d 451 (9th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 863 (1972). For a discussion of Cord, see infra note

39. For a discussion of Rose, see infra note 40.
31. 528 F.2d 652 (D.C. Cir. 1976). In Rosser, the defendant masqueraded as
an employee of the Internal Revenue Service and took control of a gas station
during the gasoline shortage in 1974. 528 F.2d at 653. The defendant was convicted under clause [1] of § 912, despite his defense that the indictment was
defective because it failed to allege fraudulent intent. Id. at 653, 658.
32. 732 F.2d at 1158 (quoting Rosser, 528 F.2d at 656). For a discussion of
the Fifth Circuit's analysis, see supra note 24 and accompanying text.
33. 732 F.2d at 1158 (quoting Rosser, 528 F.2d at 656).
34. See 18 U.S.C. § 912 (1982). Section 912, clause [1], requires that a defendant impersonating a federal officer "act as such." For the text of clause [1]
of § 912, see supra note 5.
35. 732 F.2d at 1158 (explaining Rosser, 528 F.2d at 656).
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lowed the Rosser rationale and held that attempting to exercise
pretended authority by "acting as such" was sufficient proof that a percourse he
son has sought "to cause the deceived person to follow 3some
6
would not have pursued but for the deceitful conduct."1
Having considered the minority position, the divergent rationales
underlying the majority position, and the Lepowitch definition of fraudulent intent under clause [1] of section 912, the Third Circuit explained7
what allegations were required to charge an offense under clause [2].3
The court noted that the Lepowitch Court had indicated in a dictum that
more than a mere exertion of pretended authority was required to prove
a clause [2] violation. 3 8 The Third Circuit, however, employed the anal40
in conysis used by the Seventh Circuit 3 9 and by the Second Circuit
36. Id. at 1158-59 (quoting Lepowitch, 318 U.S. at 704). The Rosser court
reasoned that Congress correctly eliminated the fraudulent intent language
from § 912 because proof of fraudulent intent was present whenever the elements (1) falsely impersonating an employee of the federal government and
(2) acting as such, were proved. Rosser, 528 F.2d at 656. The District of Columbia Circuit concluded that because the words "intent to defraud" added nothing
to the statute, they were mere surplusage. Id. Accord United States v. Robbins,
613 F.2d 688, 690-92 (8th Cir. 1979). The District of Columbia Circuit concluded that alleging the two elements of clause [1], impersonation and acting as
such, implicitly satisfied the Lepowitch definition of fraudulent intent. 528 F.2d at
656. The Rosser court stated, therefore, that "elimination of intent to defraud as
an element of the crime defined by § 912 [1] does not 'overrule Lepowitch by
relegislation or . . . modify the substance of the provision.' " Id. (quoting and
refuting Honea, 344 F.2d at 802).
37. 732 F.2d at 1158.
38. Id. (citingLepowitch, 318 U.S. at 705). For the text of clauses [1] and [2]
of § 912, see supra note 5.
39. 732 F.2d at 1158 (following United States v. Cord, 654 F.2d 490 (7th
Cir. 1981)). In Cord, the defendant defrauded a woman of $6,000 by posing as
an FBI agent investigating unauthorized withdrawals from a bank account. 654
F.2d at 490-91. The defendant appealed his conviction for violating clause [2]
of § 912 on the ground that the indictment was defective because it failed to
allege fraudulent intent. Id. at 490.
The Seventh Circuit, in affirming the defendant's conviction, reasoned that
"since the second part of the statute clearly requires that money, paper, documents or other things of value be gotten because of the pretense, it is logical to
assume that the victim has been deceived into giving them." 654 F.2d at 492
(emphasis in original). The court, therefore, concluded that since the deceived
person would not have given up something of value but for the deceitful conduct, allegations of acts sufficient to violate clause [2] satisfy the Lepowitch definition of an intent to defraud. Id. at 492. For a discussion of the Lepowitch
standard, see supra note 4.
40. 732 F.2d at 1159 (following United States v. Rose, 500 F.2d 12 (2d Cir.
1974). In Rose, the defendant was convicted of violating clause [2] of § 912 for
posing as a secret detective with the Immigration and Naturalization Service and
obtaining money from a Costa Rican immigrant for the defendant's assistance in
obtaining a passport. 500 F.2d at 13. Rejecting the defendant's argument that
the indictment was defective for failing to allege fraudulent intent, the Second
Circuit reasoned that "[t]he requirement of § 912 that the monetary or thing of
value be demanded or received in pretended character adequately covers the
possibility raised by the Lepowitch definition that the impersonation did not affect
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cluding that no allegation of fraudulent intent was needed pursuant to
clause [2] because proof that a person demanded a thing of value while
acting under pretended authority satisfied the Lepowitch definition of
41
fraudulent intent.
Thus, the Third Circuit embraced the approach advocated by the
majority of the United States courts of appeals 4 2 and concluded that intent to defraud, as defined by the Lepowitch court, was present whenever
the elements retained in either clause [1] or clause [2] of section 912
were proved. 43 The Wilkes court accordingly held that an intent to defraud need not be specifically alleged in an indictment charging a viola44
tion of either clause.
After determining the requirements of an indictment charging a violation pursuant to section 912, the Wilkes court reviewed the defendant's indictment 4 5 and concluded that since the indictment mirrored the
statutory language, it sufficiently alleged violations of both clauses of the
46
false personation statute.
In Wilkes, the Third Circuit, unlike the Fourth Circuit, 4 7 concluded
that an intent to defraud was still an element for the crime of falsely
the actions of the person deceived." Id. at 16. Thus the court held that the
indictment sufficiently stated an offense under clause [2] of § 912. Id. at 17.
41. 732 F.2d at 1158, 1159 (citing Cord, 654 F.2d at 492). The Third Circuit also rested its interpretation of § 912 on the rule of judicial construction
that "courts should be extremely hesitant to read back into the statutory definition of a crime words specifically excised by Congress." Id. at 1159 (quoting
United States v. Rosser, 528 F.2d 652, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
42. For a discussion of the majority approach, see supra notes 25-41 and
accompanying text.
43. 732 F.2d at 1159. The court explained that under clause [1] of § 912,
an intent to defraud as defined in Lepowitch is present whenever the defendant
impersonating a federal officer or employee "acts as such." Id. Under clause [2]
of § 912 an intent to defraud is present whenever someone demands money or a
thing of value in "pretended character," falsely acting under the authority of the
United States. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1159-60. Count I of the indictment charged that the defendant

"did falsely pretend and assume to be an officer and employee of the United
States acting under the authority thereof... and did falsely take upon himself to
act as such." Id. at 1159. The court concluded that these allegations sufficiently
alleged violations of both clause [1] and clause [2] of§ 912. Id. at 1160. Counts
II through XI charged that the defendant "did falsely pretend to be an officer
and employee of the United States acting under the authority thereof, that is an
employee of the Social Security Administration, and in such pretended character
did obtain the sum of $60.00, [$100.00, $100.00, $100.00, $60.00, $125.00,
$64.00, $64.00, $50.00 and $50.00] from Raymond Bender." Id. at 1159-60.
46. 732 F.2d at 1159. For the text and history of § 912, see supra note 5.
47. See United States v. Parker, 699 F.2d 177 (4th Cir.) (reaffirming position
that intent to defraud is not an element of § 912), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 122
(1983); United States v. Guthrie, 387 F.2d 569 (4th Cir. 1967) (court held fraudulent intent is no longer an element of § 912), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 927 (1968).
For an indepth analysis of Parker, see Note, supra note 26. For a discussion of
Guthrie, see supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
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personating a government official. 4 8 The Wilkes court, however, refused
to follow the Fifth Circuit, which requires that an intent to defraud be
specifically charged in an indictment alleging a violation of section
912. 4 9 It is submitted that the Third Circuit was correct in holding that
an intent to defraud, as defined in Lepowitch, need not be alleged because
50
it is present whenever the elements retained in clause [1] are proved.
In Lepowitch, the Supreme Court held that fraudulent intent for purposes
of a clause [1] violation simply involved a "deceitful attempt to affect the
course of action of another,"' 5 1 and that there was no requirement that
the deceived person give up something of value. 5 2 It is submitted that
such fraudulent intent is necessarily present when a person is shown to
have (1) pretended to be an officer or employee of the federal government, and (2) acted as such, "if acting as such is understood to mean
performing an overt act that asserts ... authority that the impersonator
claims to have by virtue of the office he pretends to hold."15 3 It is difficult to imagine a situation in which such an overt assertion of authority
would not be construed as attempting to affect another's course of action. Thus, the Third Circuit in Wilkes accurately interpreted the Le54
powitch Court's specialized definition of fraudulent intent.
Contrary to the Fourth Circuit's view, it is submitted that Congress
intended only to streamline section 912 when it revised the false personation statute in 1948.5 5 That Congress did not intend to eliminate an
intent to defraud as an element of the crime seems clear for two reasons.
First, the authors of the 1948 revisions of the federal criminal law, and
by imputation, Congress, indicated that the revisions were not intended
to enlarge the substantive definitions of any crimes. 56 Second, since the
revisers considered Lepowitch as having rendered the original statute's
48. 732 F.2d at 1159.
49. Id. For a discussion of the Fifth Circuit's approach, see supra notes 2629 and accompanying text.
50. For a discussion of Lepowitch, see supra note 4 and accompanying text.
51. 318 U.S. at 705. The Court held that within the context of the false
personation statute, the words "intent to defraud" require no more than a person having, "by artifice and deceit, sought to cause the deceived person to follow some course he would not have pursued but for the deceitful conduct." Id.
at 704. For a discussion of the Court's holding in Lepowitch, see supra note 4.
52. Id. at 705.
53. United States v. Rosser, 528 F.2d 652, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
54. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's treatment of Lepowitch in Wilkes,
see supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
55. For a discussion of the 1948 revision to the false personation statute,
see supra note 5 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the revisers' intent
to merely simplify existing federal criminal law, see supra note 24.

56. For a discussion of the revisers' intent, see supra note 24 (discussing
Judge Holtzoff s explanation of the 1948 revisions). See also H.R. REP. No. 304,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1947) (revisers intended to correct awkward language,
reconcile conflicting laws, and consolidate similar laws).
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words, "intent to defraud," as meaningless, 57 it is submitted that they
contemplated that Lepowitch's specialized definition of fraudulent intent
was to be retained in the remaining elements of clause [1]: impersonating and acting as such. Thus the revisers' elimination of "intent to defraud" did not "overrule Lepowitch by re-legislation or modify the
substance of the provision.""8 In light of Congress' intent not to change
substantive law when it revised section 912, it is submitted that the
Third Circuit acted consistently with Congress' intent not to make substantive changes in the Federal Criminal Code by retaining fraudulent
59
intent as an element of an offense under clause [1].
It is submitted that although the Third Circuit in Wilkes correctly
interpreted the Supreme Court's definition of fraudulent intent as set
forth in Lepowitch, the definition itself is too broad. Since fraudulent intent was defined as attempting to change the course of conduct of another person while impersonating a federal officer or employee, virtually
any behavior while in such guise could be construed as an attempt to
change another's course of action. 60 The import of the definition is to
equate "acting as" a federal officer or employee with a culpable mental
state. Anyone who impersonates an officer of the United States, and
57. For a discussion of the revisers' explanation for omitting the words,
"intent to defraud" from § 912, see supra note 5.
58. Honea v. United States, 344 F.2d 798, 802 (5th Cir. 1965).
59. The distinction between entirely eliminating fraudulent intent as an element of § 912 (the Fourth Circuit's approach) and holding that fraudulent intent
need not be alleged because it is implicitly present whenever the elements re-

tained in § 912 are present (the Third Circuit's approach) is noteworthy. The
latter position is by far more consistent with Congress' intent not to change
substantive law.
60. Technically, the act of asking someone for a match is an "attempt to
change the course of action of another." If the person asking for a match is, at
the time impersonating a federal official, he has manifested the requisite fraudulent intent to be convicted under the clause [1] of § 912. While this argument
might be dismissed as ridiculous, consider that the defendants in Lepowitch
merely asked a person "the whereabouts of Abe Zaidman" while pretending to
be FBI agents. United States v. Lepowitch, 48 F. Supp. 846, 847 (1942). The
district court judge granted a demurrer to the indictment, reasoning that asking
for information was "not ...taking upon themselves to act as Federal Bureau of
Investigation agents." Id. at 847. The Supreme Court never addressed the issue
of whether the defendants "acted as such" within the meaning of clause [1] of
§ 912. 318 U.S. at 703. Rather, the Supreme Court assumed that the basis of
the lower court's ruling was that the indictment failed to allege an intent to defraud. Id. Thus, it is submitted that, in defining intent to defraud for the purposes of § 912, the Supreme Court not only addressed an issue which was not
necessary to consider, it also made virtually any act, while in the guise of a federal officer, a federal offense. While asking for a match might not be considered
"acting as such," and therefore not applicable to this discussion, there is some
confusion as to what behavior constitutes "acting as such." Compare United
States v. Barnow, 239 U.S. 74, 77 (1915) ("acting as such" means no more than
to assume to act in pretended character) with United States v. Rosser, 528 F.2d
652, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (acting as such "must be something more than merely
an act in keeping with the falsely assumed character").
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"acts as such," for whatever reason, is deemed to have fraudulent intent
as defined in Lepowitch for the purposes of clause [1] of section 912.
Even if a person does not cause another person to act contrary to his
normal conduct, he may be criminally liable if he acts in a pretended
character. 6 1 The statute, therefore, as interpreted by Lepowitch, can be
62
employed to punish non-culpable as well as culpable behavior.
Given the broad Lepowitch definition of a fraudulent intent, and the
Supreme Court's explicit limitation of that definition to clause [1], it is
further submitted that the Third Circuit's application of the Lepowitch
definition to clause [2] incorrectly expands the scope of clause [2] beyond that which the Supreme Court and Congress intended. 63 Applying
61. For example, if A, impersonating an FBI agent, asked B the whereabouts of C, and B was naturally inclined to tell A where C was, despite A's deceit,
A would have the fraudulent intent required under clause [1] of § 912 since A
impersonated a federal official and "acted as such." As B would not have said
anything to A but for the deceitful conduct of A (asking the whereabouts of C
while posing as an FBI agent), the Lepowitch definition of intent to defraud would
be fulfilled. For a discussion of Lepowitch, see supra note 4.
62. It is submitted that certain behavior, which would come within the conduct prohibited by clause [1], is non-culpable behavior. For example, if a purse
snatcher stopped running from a private citizen because the citizen falsely identified himself as federal officer, the citizen could be guilty of violating clause [1]
of section 912. Having impersonated an officer and "acted as such," fraudulent
intent as defined by Lepowitch would be present since the citizen attempted to
change the thief's "course of conduct." Similarly, if a person falsely assumed
the identity of a librarian at the Library of Congress and asked someone to stop
talking, that person could be deemed guilty of violating clause [1] since the person falsely assumed to be a federal employee, and "acted as such." Since the
actor attempted to change another's course of action by requesting silence, the
actor had the requisite fraudulent intent as defined by Lepowitch. Thus, it is submitted that more than a mere attempt to change another's course of conduct
should be required before an impersonator is deemed to have "intent to
defraud."
63. The rationale for expanding the Lepowitch definition of fraudulent intent
to clause [2] is logical; if a person demands money or a valuable thing, he attempts to change the course of action of another person. While this rationale
may be logical, it does little more than state the obvious. It is submitted that
applying the Lepowitch definition of intent to defraud to clause [2] incorrectly
extends this definition beyond the Supreme Court's express limitation of its
fraudulent intent definition in Lepowitch, where the Court stated that "more than
mere deceitful attempt to affect the course of action of another is required under
the second clause of the statute." 318 U.S. at 705.
This express limitation of the specialized definition of "intent to defraud" is
in accordance with the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Barnow,
239 U.S. 74 (1915), where the Court implied that fraudulent intent in clause [2]
meant an intent to obtain something unlawfully, not an attempt to change the
course of another's conduct. In Barnow, the defendant falsely pretended to be
an employee of the United States and sold a set of books in that guise to an
unnamed citizen. Id. at 75. The defendant was indicted for violating both
clauses of the false personation statute, but the district court held that since the
federal employee that the defendant allegedly had impersonated was fictional,
no "false personation of a suppositious individual who never existed" could be
committed. Id. at 76. The Supreme Court reversed, and held that the district
court's interpretation of the statute was too narrow. Id. The court found erro-
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the broad Lepowitch definition of fraudulent intent to clause [2] will have
the same potential of punishing non-culpable conduct as applying it to
clause [1].64 The Lepowitch definition allows fraudulent intent to be
proved indirectly; the effect of its application to clause [2] is to lower the
burden of proof required under that clause, since it permits an impersonating defendant's mental state to be determined by his act of demanding or obtaining money or a valuable thing. 65 According to Wilkes,
neous the district court's conclusion that the victim was not criminally deprived
of property by the defendant within the meaning of the statute since the victim
received a set of books in exchange for money. Id. at 79. The Court held that
the purpose of the statute was not merely to "protect innocent persons from
actual loss . . . but to maintain the general good repute and dignity" of the
government. Id. at 80. The Court reasoned therefore that it was inconsistent
with the statute's purpose "to make the question whether one who has parted
with his property upon the strength of a fraudulent representation of Federal
employment, has received an adequate quid pro quo in value, determinative." Id.
at 80. The Court then stated that the value of the objects exchanged during the
deceitful scheme should be taken into consideration as "circumstantial evidence
upon the question of intent." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, it is submitted that for
purposes of clause [2], fraudulent intent had to do with an intent to obtain
something unlawfully, rather than merely attempting to change the course of
conduct of another. Accordingly, it is submitted that the Third Circuit incorrectly interpreted the definition of fraudulent intent for purposes of clause [2].
It is submitted that the Third Circuit's extension of the Lepowitch definition
of fraudulent intent to clause [2] incorrectly changes substantive criminal law in
direct contravention of Congress' stated purpose in enacting the 1948 revisions.
For a discussion of the 1948 revisions, see supra note 5. It is further submitted
that the Fifth Circuit correctly refused to extend the Lepowitch definition to
clause [2] in Honea where the court equated an intent to defraud for purposes of
clause [2] with an intent to wrongfully deprive another of property. 344 F.2d
798, 803 (5th Cir. 1965). The Honea court reasoned that "[t]o hold otherwise
would be to attribute to Congress an intent to greatly expand the scope of the
statute so as to include . . . a broad range of possible conduct which, while
blameworthy, would not ordinarily be regarded as having the major governmental significance of actions violating part [1]." Id.
64. See Honea, 344 F.2d 798. The court in Honea was concerned that applying the clause [1] definition of an intent to defraud to clause [2] would punish
non-culpable behavior. The Honea court posited the following example and
rationale:
[A]n ex-Marine, FBI man, PX clerk, Revenue Officer, or law clerk
desires to cash a check for which there are funds in the bank, but not
being known to the cashier, he flashes his expired Government ID card.
Literally, he has falsely assum[ed] to be a federal 'officer or employee,'
and 'in such pretended character' has 'obtain[ed] * * * money * * * '

Certainly Congress could conclude that this should be a federal crime.
But we do not believe that Congress in its preoccupation with offense
[1] intended purposefully to eliminate the fraudulent intent element as
to offense [2] and thereby wreak a change of major significance, both in
the moral qualities of the substantive offense and in the punishment.
The law frequently has read into a statute this very requirement of
fraudulent intent. (Citations omitted) How much more is it justified
when it was once formally a part of the statute and its omission occurred in a structural recodification.
Id. at 803.
65. If a defendant demands information by impersonation, the Supreme
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the act of demanding or obtaining a valuable thing implicitly carries with
it fraudulent intent, regardless of the impersonating defendant's actual
66
motive or mental state.
It is therefore submitted that although the Third Circuit correctly
followed precedent in applying the Lepowitch definition of fraudulent intent to a charge pursuant to clause [1], the court should not have followed the majority of circuits in extending the Lepowitch definition of
fraudulent intent to clause [2] of section 912.67 As the Supreme Court
has not fashioned a specific definition for purposes of clause [2], the
Third Circuit was free to develop a definition of its own. It is submitted
that the Third Circuit should have required specific allegations of an
intent to defraud for clause [2] offenses, more in keeping with the
Supreme Court's expression of the limited applicability of the Lepowitch
definition, and with Congress' intent not to change the substantive law
of section 912.68
DavidJ. JViedis
Court has held that clause [2] of § 912 applies even if the information is "wholly
valueless." Lepowitch, 318 U.S. at 704.
66. For an example of non-culpable behavior that could violate the elements in clause [2], see supra note 64.
67. For a discussion of cases applying the Lepowitch definition of intent to
defraud to a clause [2] offense, see supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
68. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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